Transport is total defence

Imagine 50 mechanised battalions – around 50,000 soldiers with vehicles and supplies – arriving in Norway within ten days. They must be received and transported onwards to northern Finland.

This is the scenario that the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) and the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation have used to stress-test Norway’s host nation support. It is not an operational plan, but nor is it unrealistic. The conclusion is clear: if arrivals are concentrated, capacity will fail and delays will occur.

In a security crisis, delays could weaken NATO’s ability to reinforce the High North. Transport can therefore no longer be regarded solely as a matter of transport policy. Transport is total defence.

Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO has changed Norway’s strategic geography. Finland’s 1,340-kilometre border with Russia has more than doubled NATO’s direct border with the country. Norway is now also a point of entry and transit country for allied forces and supplies heading east.

FFI’s analysis covers arrivals through the Oslofjord, Trondheimsfjord, Ranafjord and Ofotfjord. When arrivals are evenly distributed across several locations, Norway can manage them with support from civilian operators. When forces arrive simultaneously or at only a few locations, capacity gaps emerge in quays, unloading facilities, maintenance services and the transport of heavy equipment.

Transporting heavy equipment remains a particular challenge. Rail is cost-effective, but the network has little redundancy and only four cross-border lines. Norway therefore needs a robust chain from port to border, not a collection of isolated projects.

A new framework is in place

The government has taken an important step. In February, it established a new objective for the National Transport Plan 2029–2040: “A resilient transport sector that contributes to Norway’s overall defence capability.” For the first time, the transport sector’s contribution to national defence has become an explicit national objective.

Norway’s white paper on total preparedness also firmly links transport to military resilience. It describes transport as a critical societal function and a prerequisite for military operations.

The armed forces have defined what they need, and the relevant transport authorities are now working together on routes that are vital to military mobility. This marks a necessary departure from siloed thinking.

But the new objective does not formally take effect until 2029. That is too late if transport priorities remain unchanged until then.

Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO has made Norway both a frontline state and a transit country, with the High North serving as a hub linking the North Atlantic, Sweden and Finland.

At the same time, Norway faces major vulnerabilities. Its railways, roads and ports were designed for peacetime traffic, not large-scale military movements.

Roads in the High North are particularly exposed. The E6 is the main north–south corridor, but landslides, floods, accidents and maintenance work can close it for long periods. Alternative routes often run through Sweden or Finland.

The railway network offers limited capacity and few alternatives. Ofoten Line is strategically important, but a single derailment can block it. Port capacity also varies considerably, and several ports lack the equipment and infrastructure needed to handle heavy military cargo.

These are not purely military weaknesses. The same infrastructure supports businesses, public services and local communities every day.

That is why investments in total defence also strengthen civilian resilience. A bridge capable of carrying heavy military vehicles can also support industry. A port that can receive allied forces can help maintain supply chains during a civilian crisis. Alternative routes improve preparedness for both war and extreme weather.

Norway must therefore assess infrastructure according to more than traffic volumes and socioeconomic returns in peacetime. Security, redundancy and military mobility must also carry weight.

Plans must become priorities

PA Consulting’s Secure Futures survey shows that 62 per cent of Norwegians believe the risk of war or conflict has increased over the past five years. Yet only one in three believes that Norway is adequately prepared for major security threats.

This gives the government a strong mandate to act. But preparedness cannot be built through plans alone. It requires priorities, investment and implementation.

The government has already introduced a new objective for the National Transport Plan. The next step is to ensure that it affects actual investment decisions.

Transport preparedness should become part of the 2027 national budget rather than waiting for the next full planning period. Projects that strengthen military mobility and civilian resilience should move forward, even if they would not rank highest under conventional transport models.

This does not mean that every road, railway or port should be designed primarily for military use. It means identifying the infrastructure on which Norway and its allies would depend during a crisis and ensuring that it works when needed.

Several measures should take priority.

First, Norway must strengthen the main transport corridors from ports to the Swedish and Finnish borders. These routes must have sufficient capacity and viable alternatives if a road, railway or bridge becomes unavailable.

Second, Norway must improve port capacity and ensure that selected ports can receive, unload and move large volumes of heavy equipment quickly.

Third, critical bridges, tunnels and railway sections must be assessed against military requirements, not only ordinary civilian traffic.

Finally, Norway needs closer cooperation between the armed forces, transport authorities, local government and private operators. Much of the country’s transport capacity belongs to or is operated by civilian organisations. Their role must be planned and tested before a crisis occurs.

Norway has already taken some steps. The government has allocated NOK 102 million to strengthen 14 bridges that are important for military mobility. This is welcome, but 14 bridges do not constitute a transport system.

Four measures Norway should take now

1. Apply the new transport objective to the 2027 national budget. If the objective guides long-term planning, it should also guide current spending priorities.
2. Accelerate improvements to routes essential to military mobility. Prioritise bridges, ports, rail connections and alternative routes in the High North.
3. Assess transport projects according to security and resilience as well as ordinary socioeconomic returns. Infrastructure that supports both civilian society and military mobility has particular value.
4. Test the entire transport chain in realistic exercises. Norway must know whether ports, roads, railways, operators and authorities can work together when large volumes of personnel and equipment arrive at short notice.

Norway now has a better framework for transport preparedness: a new objective, a clear picture of military requirements and closer Nordic cooperation. But total defence is not measured in plans. It is measured by whether the quay can unload, the bridge can carry the weight, the road remains open and the equipment arrives when it matters.

This article was first published in Finansavisen in Norwegian.